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Forthcoming in Democratization 
 
Abstract: One of the main principals upon which liberal-democratic and non-democratic 
regimes differ is the incorporation of diverse viewpoints into public life.  Exposure to such 
variety highlights any existing heterogeneity in society, and, for most individuals, exposure to 
this heterogeneity promotes tolerance of difference (pluralistic conditioning).  However, those 
who are exposed to diversity under aversive conditions are instead pushed toward intolerance of 
difference (aversive pluralistic conditioning).  We thus predict that increased democracy will 
increase tolerance of outgroups in general while decreasing tolerance among authoritarians, who 
are defined by their inherent distaste of diversity, relative to the general population.  We test 
these predictions with multilevel models and survey data across several countries and find strong 
support for our expectations: under non-aversive conditions, exposure to the diversity inherent to 
effective democracy corresponds with higher levels of tolerance of outgroups; exposure under 
aversive conditions corresponds with relatively lower levels of tolerance toward outgroups. 
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Modern democracy is based in dissent and diversity.  The essential defining aspect of democracy 
is the existence of competitive and fair elections; an element which emphasizes diversity of 
opinion and serves to place one party (or group of parties) in power, while relegating the other(s) 
to dissent. 
The diversity inherent to democratic systems instills in a FRXQWU\¶V LQKDELWDQWVDn awareness of 
difference, which in turn propagates more tolerant individuals.  In autocratic regimes, expression 
of diversity is restrained, being considered the basis of disorder and thereby detrimental to the 
state.  In liberal democratic societies, freedom of expression and speech and a free media are 
widely accepted principles.  Political parties and social groups in liberal democratic societies are 
therefore able to express varied and opposing opinions on societal concerns, and such opinions 
are broadcast to large swaths of the population.  Exposure to such variety indicates to even the 
most inattentive of individuals that they reside in a diverse and heterogeneous society.  For many 
individuals, exposure to diversity promotes tolerance of difference. 
While diversity tends to breed tolerance, there is a critical exception to this generality.  Exposure 
to diversity only facilitates tolerance of difference when such exposure occurs under positive or 
neutral conditions.  Those who are exposed to diversity under aversive conditions are instead 
pushed toward intolerance of difference. 
Our thesis in this paper is thus one of pluralistic conditioning.  In general, when individuals are 
exposed to diversity under positive or neutral conditions, they become more tolerant of diversity.  
However, when individuals are exposed to diversity under aversive conditions, they become less 
tolerant of difference.  This thesis unites findings from multiple disciplines under a single 
theoretical framework.   
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This paper diverges from previous research relating democracy with tolerance in four key 
aspects.  First, we provide a unified framework from which to view findings from numerous 
disciplines and research areas.  Second, we examine propose a theory which takes an affective, 
rather than a cognitive, perspective.  Third, complementing our affective perspective, we 
examine generalized social tolerance rather than political tolerance.  Finally, we examine both 
the positive and the negative side of this thesis, whether exposure to diversity under general 
conditions promotes tolerance and whether under negative conditions facilitates intolerance 
toward outgroups.  Examining the negative side of this thesis is clearly a problematic issue as 
one must point to a single and consistent element that occurs across a large range of countries 
and that creates an aversive environment under which exposure to the diversity inherent to 
democracy occurs.  Fortunately, the literature on individual authoritarianism provides one such 
element, an authoritarian predisposition. 
Authoritarians, those posessing an authortiarian predisposition, are individuals defined by their 
inherent aversion to diversity.  Individuals with an authoritarian predisposition are unavoidably 
exposed to diversity under aversive conditions as diversity itself is aversive to these individuals.   
Authoritarians, unlike their fellow citizens, should become notably more intolerant when 
exposed to increased levels of effective, i.e., more liberal, democracy; authoritarians' reaction to 
increased effective democracy will test whether exposure to the diversity inherent in liberal 
democracy under aversive conditions results in decreased tolerance relative to the population. 
Guided by the pluralistic conditioning thesis, this article empirically examines the relationship 
between effective democracy and individual tolerance toward outgroups.  Using the World 
Values Survey and the European Values Study (WVS/EVS), we test whether higher levels of  
effective democracy corresponds with an increase in tolerance among individuals in general, and 
 4 
a decrease in tolerance among authoritarians.  Multilevel conditional models provide support for 
our thesis: in general, higher levels of effective democracy correspond with higher levels of 
tolerance toward outgroups; among authoritarians, higher levels of effective democracy 
correspond with an increase in intolerance toward outgroups, relative to the sample as a whole. 
Democracy and Diversity 
Our primary goal in this research is to dissect the relationship between democracy and tolerance, 
with a specific focus toward introducing an affective explanation for the relationship between 
liberal democracy and individual tolerance.  Thus, we begin by examining the degree to which 
liberal democracy propagates the expression of diversity.  We then discuss the psychological 
mechanisms that lead democracy to foster tolerance and intolerance among different segments of 
the population.    
In the seventeenth century, the traditional wisdom of governance began to corrode; the belief that 
diversity embodied discord and disorder and that unanimity was necessary for a successful state 
faded.  This wisdom was replaced by a general acceptance of diversity and an increasing 
suspicion of pure consensus.  This alteration in political dogma led to the development of liberal 
democratic institutions, and, piece by piece, to societies governed by modern liberal democratic 
regimes.1 
Modernization theory suggests that the shift away from traditional notions of unanimity and 
toward support for diversity derives from a shift in societal values that accompany increased 
economic security.  The current incarnation of modernization theory stems from the idea that a 
shift in values corresponds to generational replacement of the populace.2  As younger 
generations who come of age in an economically secure environment replace those raised in an 
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era of uncertainty and insecurity, societal values become more secular-rational and self-
expressive, as opposed to traditional and survival oriented.3  This shift in values results in a 
diverse society that increasingly demands a more responsive and democratically inclusive 
political system. 
Movement along the path from autocratic to liberal democratic regimes is a step toward allowing 
the diversity inherent in modernized societies to manifest.  Liberal democratic institutions derive 
from a pluralistic society; from a society of cross-cutting cleavages tied to the principle of 
concordia discors, dissenting consensus.4  Liberal democratic principles such as freedom of 
speech and freedom of expression are, in the abstract, supported by an overwhelming majority in 
any democratic society.5  The concrete application of these abstract principles along with a free 
media grants the opportunity for the diversity inherent in a society to be revealed for all to see. 
Democracy and liberalism, however, are not inexorably linked.  As the democratic transitions 
literature demonstrates, there is reason for concern regarding how effective newly emerging 
democracies truly are in promoting pluralism and tolerance, especially since the third wave of 
democratization in the 1990s.6  The divergence of democratic institutions from liberal 
democratic principles manifests in a distinction between purely formal, procedural  democracy 
and effective, substantive democracy.7  Formal democracy has little meaning if political rights 
and civil liberties are withheld or obstructed by a tyrannical majority or a corrupt elite.  As Heller 
argues: 
An effective democracy has two interrelated characteristics ± a robust civil society and a 
capable state. A free and lively civil society makes the state and its agents more 
accountable by guaranteeing that consultation takes place not just through electoral 
reSUHVHQWDWLRQSHULRGLFPDQGDWHVEXWDOVRWKURXJKFRQVWDQWIHHGEDFNDQGQHJRWLDWLRQ« 
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The capacity of the state is also central to the effectiveness of democracy. Procedural 
guarantees of civic and political rights, including rights of association and free speech, do 
QRWDXWRPDWLFDOO\WUDQVODWH LQWRWKHHIIHFWLYHH[HUFLVHRIGHPRFUDWLFULJKWV«,QGLYLGXDOV
and groups must be protected from arbitrary state action but also from forms of social 
authority that might constrain or impinge upon their civic and political liberties. And 
creating public spaces that are protected from nondemocratic forms of authority requires 
far more than writing constitutions and holding officials accountable.8 
Considering the distinction between formal and effective democracy expands the conceptual 
framework of democracy from a categorical, yes or no, distinction, into a continuum from a pure 
autocracy to a fully effective democracy which fully incarnates liberal democratic principles into 
concrete practice.  As liberal democratic principles embody the pluralistic ideals of dissent and 
diversity, this continuum from autocracy to a fully effective democracy, in turn, corresponds 
with a continuum ranging from complete suppression to full expression of diversity. 
Pluralistic Conditioning 
The proposed pathway from liberal democracy to tolerance flows from the manifestation of 
diversity, to the propagation of exposure to diversity, and then to tolerance of diversity.9  
Individuals in societies where diversity is manifest are exposed to diversity via both intergroup 
contact and the media.  Exposure to diversity in the absence of aversive conditions inculcates, in 
a largely unconscious fashion, a positive perception of diversity.  As such, individuals become 
more tolerant toward outgroups; people become conditioned to accept difference as a normal and 
unthreatening facet of society.  We refer to this phenomenon as pluralistic conditioning. 
Pluralistic conditioning is a specific application of the mere exposure effect.10  The mere 
exposure thesis states that attitudes toward a neutral stimulus become more positive with 
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repeated exposure, and awareness of this exposure is not necessary.  Simply having a stimulus 
within perceptive rangH LV VXIILFLHQW WR LPSURYH SHRSOH¶V DWWLWXGHV WRZDUG LW  Essentially, the 
PHUHH[SRVXUHHIIHFW³can be regarded as a form of classical conditioning if we assume that the 
DEVHQFH RI DYHUVLYH HYHQWV FRQVWLWXWHV WKH XQFRQGLWLRQHG VWLPXOXV´11 DQG WKHUHE\ ³provides a 
flexible means of forming selective attachments and affective dispositions, with remarkably 
minimal investment of energy, even when exposures are not accessible to awareness.´12 
The mere exposure effect creates affective attachment rather than cognitive attachment; mere 
exposure accounts for object attachment without cognitive processing of information.  The 
independence of attitude change from cognition has been found in numerous studies.  Cacioppo 
and Petty, for example, demonstrate that recall of issue content is not necessary for attitude 
change; although being able to recall the content of an issue does lead to stronger attitudes than 
non-recall.13  Even a single exposure to a stimulus can result in attitude change lasting up to a 
year, while repeated exposure lengthens this duration.14  Mere exposure theory suggests that 
exposure to diversity in the absence of aversive conditions will lead to generally positive 
attitudes toward diversity itself. 
Pluralistic conditioning is exemplified in Intergroup Contact Theory.  Going beyond the 
VLPSOLVWLF ³IDPLOLDULW\ EUHHGV OLNLQJ´ WKHVLV ZKLFK ZDV HIIHFWLYHO\ GLVPLVVHG LQ WKH ¶V D
number of theories have focused on the circumstances of contact in determining whether contact 
leads to negative, neutral, or positive affect toward a target group.15  Intergroup Contact Theory 
as revised by Pettigrew specifies that reduction in prejudice occurs only under conditions which 
result in acquaintance or friendship potential.16  These conditions, summarized efficiently by 
Pettigrew, all share the quality of being neutral or positive environments and interactions.17 
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Alternatively, forced or necessary interaction, as opposed to voluntary interaction, may have 
little if any effect on attitudes, and exposure under conditions of high intergroup anxiety and 
threat may hinder or reverse the otherwise positive effects of contact.18  Essentially, durational 
positive orientations only develop in the absence of aversive conditions.  And, as with the 
positive effect of mere exposure on tolerance of diversity in general, studies on affective 
prejudice find the beneficial effects of non-aversive exposure to a single outgroup (i.e., a 
reduction in anti-outgroup sentiment) also produces a general beneficial effect on prejudice 
toward all outgroups.19  Further, this line of study emphasizes that this positive orientation 
towards outgroups due to exposure is primarily a function of affect (reduced anxiety) rather than 
cognition (increased knowledge).20 
Research also indicates that exposure to diversity need not be direct.  Information is also a valid 
stimulus.  As with information in general, information that relays a perception of diversity can 
travel through a number of media.  The most extensive media network is, of course, the mass 
media of a society.  A long research tradition notes the impact of mass media on attitude change.  
(QWPDQQRWHVWKDW³WKHPHUHSUHVHQFHRIFRQIOLFWLQJYLHZVLQWKHQHZVPD\FRQYH\DQDZDUHQHVV
of the diversity of the country, including its variety of races, economic FODVVHVDQGYLHZSRLQWV´
DQG ³>V@XFK FRQVFLRXVQHVV PD\ SURPRWH WROHUDQFH RI FKDQJH DQG HPSDWK\ IRU SRVLWLRQV RU
JURXSV WKDW FKDOOHQJH WKH VWDWXV TXR´21  Such diversity in news coverage can be inspired by 
political institutions themselves and can serve to inculcate more tolerant attitudes toward a 
variety of outgroups among the general public.22  Simply put, exposure to information that 
portrays a diverse society, whether that information takes the form of a physical encounter with a 
member of an outgroup or hearing a news report regarding a debate in parliament, serves to 
instill tolerant attitudes, if such exposure is under non-aversive conditions. 
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Importantly, the pluralistic conditioning thesis also predicts the spread of intolerance; when 
exposed to diversity in the presence of aversive conditions, an individual will become less 
tolerant of diversity in society.  In this sense, pluralistic conditioning can be thought of as a 
neutral descriptor with a positive and negative application dependent on sociopolitical 
circumstances.  However, for ease of use, we equate the term pluralistic conditioning with the 
positive use of the term; when referring to the negative application and associating pluralistic 
conditioning with intolerance, we use the terminology aversive pluralistic conditioning. 
Democratic Diversity and Intolerance 
That exposure to diversity under aversive conditions can have a deleterious effect on tolerance is 
supported by ethnic competition theory and realistic group conflict theory.  Ethnic competition 
theory focuses on cultural threat, and argues that intolerance is engendered when a sizeable 
outgroup is perceived to pose a threat to the cultural status quo, introducing competition over 
customs, values, and identity.23  Realistic group conflict theory argues from an economic 
perspective, proposing that intergroup conflict and anti-outgroup sentiment results from 
intergroup competition over limited resources.24  Both of these theories argue that threat results 
in increased intolerance toward outgroups.  
A more general and universally applicable demonstration of aversive pluralistic intolerance is 
provided by theory and research from the individual authoritarianism literature.  Stenner argues 
that due to cognitive and psychological development, authoritarians find diversity aversive.25  
For authoritarians, diversity itself creates an aversive environment and will exacerbate 
intolerance toward outgroups. 
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Stenner, in order to account for conditional effects associated with threat perception,26 develops 
and employs an interactive model of authoritarianism she refers to as the authoritarian 
dynamic.27  Stenner argues that as a result of a cognitive incapacity to deal with diversity, 
authoritarians possess an inherent aversion to heterogeneity and a preference for uniformity and 
group cohesion.  In a particularly telling experiment, she finds that authoritarians interviewed by 
an outgroup member (black Americans in this case) demonstrate substantially higher levels of 
intolerance than those interviewed by members of the ingroup (white Americans). 
For authoritarians diversity and dissent are aversive conditions.  Authoritarians are thereby 
automatically exposed to diversity under aversive conditions; for authoritarians, exposure to 
diversity and dissent is also exposure to normative threat and is thereby psychologically aversive.  
As authoritarians are fundamentally predisposed to perceive diversity aversively, they are an 
ideal group with which to demonstrate how pluralism can lead to intolerance under aversive 
conditions.  Aversive pluralistic conditioning predicts that authoritarians who are exposed to the 
diversity and dissent inherent to liberal democracy will become more intolerant of those they see 
as different. 
The central question of this research regards the relationship between democracy and tolerance.  
Our theory provides two hypotheses: first, in general, (H1) the diversity and dissent inherent to 
democracy will provide for a more tolerant individual (pluralistic conditioning); second, (H2) the 
diversity and dissent inherent to democracy will exacerbate the relationship between 
authoritarianism and intolerance (aversive pluralistic conditioning).  
Data and Concept Measurement 
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Our individual-level data comes from the 1995-1997, 1999-2000, and 2005 waves of the WVS 
and the corresponding 1999-2000 wave of the EVS.  Though some countries are surveyed in 
more than one wave, we include only the most recent survey year in such cases.  Data is 
available on each variable across 75 countries28 and 75,478 individuals.  There is an average of 
 LQGLYLGXDOV SHU FRXQWU\ LQ WKH VDPSOH ZLWK D ORZ RI  DQG D KLJK RI   ³'RQ¶W
NQRZ´ DQVZHUV DUH FRGHG DV PLVVLQJ DQG DOO REVHUYDWLRQV ZLWK PLVVLQJ GDWD DUH H[FOXGHG
listwise. 
Social Tolerance 
When attempting to isolate how tolerance and context are related, one must possess a context-
neutral measure.  Without this, one cannot determine whether the relationship is biased due to an 
improper tolerance measure.  Previous studies of tolerance, especially those related to political 
tolerance, are (intentionally) heavily context dependent and fail to meet this basic requirement. 
The items often used in political tolerance studies are problematic because they reference 
specific groups and specific acts.29  One of the notable claims of Sullivan et al. is that Americans 
are not becoming more tolerant in general, as claimed by Nunn at al., but are becoming more 
tolerant of certain groups.30  This is determined by identifying the least-liked group of the 
respondent and using that group to contextualize the tolerance items.  However, as noted by 
Chong, the content-FRQWUROOHGVWUDWHJ\RI6XOOLYDQHWDO³IDOWHUVEHFDXVHLWVXPPDUL]HVWKHOHYHO
of tolerance in a society on the basis of an extreme data point.  Instead, we should examine the 
range or variety of groups in a society to which people are willing to extend basic civil 
OLEHUWLHV´31  Sullivan et al. and Nunn et al. are problematic in that they assume an individual who 
does not support the right for a certain group to hold a public rally, among other acts, is 
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intolerant of that group.  In reality, that individual may be against the specific act; such as a 
public rally.32  Further, there is a considerable difference between an individual who is intolerant 
of a single outgroup and one who is intolerant of any outgroup. 
While such specific content-controlled and situational measures of tolerance are clearly 
necessary for theses related to the relationship between abstract democratic principles and more 
concrete expressions of those principles, for those interested solely in tolerance of outgroups, 
such measures confound the issue.  We therefore make use of a minimalist measure of social 
tolerance which avoids all such confusion by relying on questions that seek solely to determine if 
the respondent is willing to live in the vicinity of a member of a certain group. 
Our primary dependent variable, social tolerance, is defined as a positive general orientation 
WRZDUGJURXSVRXWVLGHRIRQH¶VRZQ $VVXFK, we create a measure that captuUHVUHVSRQGHQWV¶
underlying dispositions towards those who are unlike themselves.  The social tolerance measure 
is created from six questions drawn from the WVS/EVS, which are ideal for this study.  Each 
question is a binary measure of rejection or acceptance of a distinct group as neighbors: people 
of a different race, immigrants/foreign workers, people with AIDS, homosexuals, drug users, and 
heavy drinkers.  These groups are chosen to yield as wide a variety of groups as possible; as the 
definition of social tolerance references all outgroups, the larger number of groups included in 
the social tolerance scale allows an individual to be a member of a certain group (within the 
scale) without invalidating the scale for that individual. 
7KH VFDOH¶V &URQEDFK¶V alpha value is 0.63 across all countries.  The moderate alpha is not 
unexpected as these groups form distinctive categories.  An exploratory factor analysis (using a 
polychoric correlation matrix) indicates that the social tolerance scale is composed of two 
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separate, yet correlated, groups: the first being composed of people of a different race and 
immigrants/foreign workers and the second being composed of people with AIDS, homosexuals, 
drug users, and heavy drinkers.  As the scale is intentionally inclusive of a variety of distinct 
social groups that are viewed with differing levels of acceptance depending on the country under 
consideration, we choose to retain the scale. A higher value on this scale indicates a higher level 
of social tolerance.  The mean social tolerance value for each country in the dataset is depicted in 
Figure 1. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
To further demonstrate robustness, we also present results for two separate social tolerance 
scales below²one focusing on race and immigration and the other composed of the questions 
related to AIDS, homosexuals, drug users, and heavy drinkers.  Further, analyses using each 
individual tolerance item as the dependent variable do not substantively change the conclusions 
reached from those reported using the scale.   
Effective Democracy 
As noted above, there is a distinction between purely formal democracy and effective 
democracy.  Definitions of formal democracy center on the procedural or institutional 
organization of a country and classify a country as democratic if there is "free competition for a 
free vote."33  Formal definitions of democracy are unconcerned with the substantive outcomes of 
the democratic process. 
The concept of effective democracy is a "substantive definition" of democracy and argues that 
formal democracy means little if institutionalized political rights and civil liberties are withheld 
or obstructed by a tyrannical majority or a corrupt elite.  As our argument linking democracy and 
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tolerance necessitates the free expression of diversity, we adopt the more substantive 
conceptualization of modern liberal democracy.  Our measure of democracy therefore accounts 
for not only the presence of formal democracy in a country, but also for how effective countries 
are in their application of liberal democratic principles.   
WHFRQVWUXFWRXUSULPDU\ LQGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHDVDPHDVXUHRI³HIIHFWLYHGHPRFUDF\´34  This 
measure is based on the Freedom House scores fRU³FLYLOOLEHUWLHV´DQG³SROLWLFDOULJKWV´ZKLFK
account for the institutionalization of liberal GHPRFUDWLF SULQFLSOHV DQG WKH :RUOG %DQN¶V
Worldwide Governance Indicators' ³FRQWURO RI FRUUXSWLRQ´ VFRUHV ZKLFK DFFRXQW IRU WKH
effective delivery of institutionalized liberal democracy.35  7KH ³FLYLO OLEHUWLHV´ DQG ³SROLWLFDO
ULJKWV´PHDVXUHVDUHLQYHUWHGVRWKDWKLJKHUVFRUHVLQGLFDWHPRUHIUHHGRPVXPPHGDQGUHVFDOHG
WR UDQJH IURP WR 7KH ³FRQWURORIFRUUXSWLRQ´ PHDVXUH LV UHVFDOHG WR UDQJH IURP to 1.  
These two measures are then multiplied to produce the effective democracy measure, ranging, in 
theory, from 0 to 10.  For each country the measures correspond to the year the WVS/EVS 
survey began.  The value of this variable for each country in the dataset is displayed in Figure 2. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Authoritarian Predisposition 
Feldman and Stenner propose a measurement strategy for authoritarianism that separates a 
predisposition to intolerance (i.e., an authoritarian predisposition) from intolerant attitudes.36  
7KLVPHDVXUHRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VDXWKRULWDULDQSUHGLVSRVLWLRQLVFRPSRVHGRITXHVWLRQVLQTXLULQJ
LQWR DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V FKLOGUHDULQJ YDOXHV 7KH DXWKRUV DUJXH WKDW WKHVH TXHVWLRQV XQREWUXVLYHO\
without evoking authoritarian attitudes, measurH DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V SUHGLVSRVLWLRQ WR H[SUHVV
authoritarian attitudes under conditions of normative threat; in their own words: 
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Although this is not a traditional measure of authoritarianism, it has long been noted that this dimension of 
child-rearing values is strongly related to other authoritarianism measures and to presumed consequences of 
DXWKRULWDULDQLVP«)URPDOHQJWK\HPSLULFDOVWXG\RILQWROHUDQFH0DUWLQFRQFOXGHV³7KHUHLVSUREDEO\QR
other question on which tolerants differ from intolerants more sharply than on child-UHDULQJSUDFWLFHV«:H
believe that this dimension of child-rearing values provides an excellent, nonobtrusive measure of 
authoritarian predispositions. It is particularly useful for our purposes since it does not include questions 
tapping presumed consequences of authoritarianism ± like prejudice and intolerance ± that make up our set of 
independent variables.37 
Concurring with the logic of Feldman and Stenner, we follow Stenner, Dunn and Singh, and 
[identifying citation removed] who utilize specific child-rearing values questions from the 
Values surveys to measure an individual's authoritarian predisposition.38  The authoritarian 
SUHGLVSRVLWLRQVFDOHLVFRPSRVHGRIIRXUTXHVWLRQVJDXJLQJWKHUHVSRQGHQW¶VYLHZDVWRGHVLUDEOH
qualities to instill in children: independence, imagination, and respect/tolerance for others, all 
reverse coded, and obedience.   
Following [identifying citation removed], we argue that the authoritarian predisposition scale is a 
formative rather than a reflective scale and therefore do not report an alpha coefficient.39  
Reflective measurement signifies that the component variables in the scale are interchangeable 
with one another and that the error variance associated with each indicator of the latent concept 
is independent.  Formally:  
xj  ȜjȘİj 
where xj is the jWKLQGLFDWRURIWKHODWHQWYDULDEOHȘȜj LVWKHFRHIILFLHQWFDSWXULQJWKHHIIHFWRIȘ
on xjDQGİj is the measurement error for the jth indicator.  The purpose of combining multiple 
indicators of a single concept is to cancel out as much error as possible, thereby leaving a more 
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precise measure of the concept.  Scale reliability is meant to address this theory of measurement, 
with a higher reliability indicating a high level of shared variance among the component items. 
As conceptualized by Stenner, authoritarianism LV³DQ LQGLYLGXDOSUHGLVSRVLWLRQFRQFHUQHGZLWK
the appropriate balance between group authority and uniformity, on the one hand, and individual 
DXWRQRP\DQGGLYHUVLW\RQWKHRWKHU´40  Authoritarianism is defined by reference to convergent 
and competing values and cannot be gauged by reference to a single value or a single polar value 
dimension.  To measure an authoritarian predisposition, it is necessary to account for multiple 
convergent and competing values, as is noted in the definition above.  A reflective scale would 
require, for example, that a low score on the obedience question should indicate a high score on 
the independence or imagination or tolerance and respect questions.  However, any given 
respondent can justifiably score all of those values equally highly, especially when not required 
to rank order them and when the survey instrument blunts the response option to yes/no as it 
does in the WVS/EVS.41 
An authoritarian predisposition (the latent construct) is determined here via the combination of 
its constituent indicators rather than the indicators being determined by authoritarianism and 
therefore requires formative measurement.  This measurement strategy does not require 
correlated items as the following formula indicates: 
Ș 
S
j=1
m Ȗjxjȗ 
ZKHUHȖj is a coefficient capturing the effect of indicator xj RQ WKH ODWHQWYDULDEOH ȘDQGȗ LVD
disturbance term.  The constituent items in formative measurement are not considered to possess 
their own measurement error and therefore the goal of formative measurement is not to decrease 
the measurement error of these items.  Instead, the latent variable possesses its own construct-
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level error (i.e., that portion of the construct not provided for by the formative indicators) 
reflected in the disturbance term.  The goal in formative measurement is to create a construct that 
is not reflected in any of the formative indicators. 
The items used to construct this scale are formative to the concept of authoritarianism rather than 
reflective of it.  If we remove certain items, the others will not necessarily compensate for their 
loss and the scale will lose its ability to measure the concept.42  As the items contribute to a face 
valid construct and the scale correlates with relevant other variables in the dataset in a 
predictable fashion, we are confident in proceeding with this scale. 
Though we often refer to authoritarians as a distinct group, this is more for conceptual clarity than 
accuracy.  It is important to keep in mind that authoritarianism is a scale with no solid cutpoints (outside 
of those that numerical scales generate due to measurement issues).  It is more accurate to state that some 
are more or less authoritarian than others.  Those traits associated with authoritarians are likely found in 
all of us, just not to the same degree and/or under the same circumstances. 
Control Variables 
We include age, education, gender, ideology, and religiosity as individual-level control variables 
and modernization and social heterogeneity as country-level control variables, all of which are 
generally associated with tolerance.  We briefly discuss the rationale, expectations, and 
measurement for these variables below. 
Age: As discussed by Inglehart and others, older cohorts tend to be less tolerant.43  We thus 
include a variable for age, coded in years. 
Education: Social tolerance and education are generally held to be positively related.44  As the 
education variable from the WVS was coded slightly differently between the 1999 and 2005 
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surveys and as the arbitrary rank ordering of technical education below university-preparatory 
education seems unwarranted, we have recoded the education variable into six categories: no or 
incomplete primary (elementary) education, complete primary education, incomplete secondary 
school (technical or university-preparatory), complete secondary school (technical or university-
preparatory), university education without degree, and university education with degree.  Higher 
values indicate a higher level of education. 
Gender:  Previous research demonstrates that females tend toward more egalitarian social 
policies than men and are thereby likely to hold more tolerant social attitudes.45  We control for 
gender using a categorical variable, with females coded 0 and males coded 1. 
,GHRORJ\$SHUVRQ¶VOHIW-right (or liberal-conservative in the U.S.) identification is often found 
to be related to tolerance, with those identifying with the Left more tolerant than those who 
identify with the Right.46  Ideology is a self-reported measure of Left±Right identification, with 
higher values indicating right-wing tendency. 
Religiosity:  Religiosity is shown to have a negative relationship with social tolerance in 
numerous studies, often irrespective of particular religions or denominations.47  To gauge 
religiosity, we create a scale based on four questions.  The questions inquire as to the importance 
RI UHOLJLRQ LQ RQH¶V OLIH WKH IUHTXHQF\ RI DWWHQGDQFH RI UHOLJLRXV VHUYLFH RQH¶V VHOI-described 
UHOLJLRVLW\DQGWKH LPSRUWDQFHRIJRGLQRQH¶V OLIH 7KHVFDOH\LHOGVDUHOLDELOLW\FRHIILFLHQWRI
0.83. 
Per Capita GDP: Inglehart and Welzel argue that the sustained economic growth associated with 
modern societies is the driving force behind the formation of self-expression values, of which 
tolerance is a part.48  To measure economic development, we use the common indicator of per 
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capita GDP, adjusted for purchasing power, standardized to constant U.S. dollars in thousands, 
and logged.  This variDEOH LV WDNHQ IURP WKH :RUOG%DQN¶V :RUOG'HYHORSPHQW ,QGLFDWRUV IRU
each country and corresponds to the year in which the WVS/EVS wave began. 
Social Heterogeneity: Social fractionalization, while fostering tolerant attitudes, is also a 
necessary condition for societal conflict between groups.49  As Hodson et al. note, 
³>K@HWHURJHQHLW\ SURYLGHV WKH FRQGLWLRQV IRVWHULQJ LQFUHDVHG WROHUDQFH DPRQJ LQGLYLGXDOV RI
diverse nationality through increased contact, but it also creates the conditions under which 
differHQWQDWLRQDOJURXSVHQJDJH LQFRPSHWLWLRQRYHUVFDUFHUHVRXUFHV´50  Thus, we control for 
social heterogeneity with no a priori assumption regarding how it will affect social tolerance.  To 
measure social heterogeneity we use the popular ethnic fractionalization index developed by 
Alesina et al., in which higher values indicate more diversity.51  For each country, the measure 
again corresponds to the year in which the WVS/EVS wave began. 
Each variable is summarized across the dataset in Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Methods and Results 
Our initial hypothesis is that tolerance should increase with the level of democracy.  Figure 3 
illustrates this bivariate relationship across the 75 countries in our sample at the aggregate level.  
The local regression line in the plot indicates that there is a positive and near-linear relationship 
between these two variables.  The correlation is 0.619.   
[Figure 3 about here] 
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This initial examination provides some evidence for our expectation that democracy and 
tolerance are positively linked.  However, our theoretical mechanisms operate at the individual 
level.  In our sample, the data is observed at two levels, as individuals (level-1) are grouped 
within countries (level-2).  A multilevel model is well suited to our theory, which dictates a 
relationship between a country-level independent variable (effective democracy) and an 
individual-level dependent variable (social tolerance) and, further, requires an interaction 
between a country-level factor (again, effective democracy) and an individual-level factor 
(authoritarian predisposition).   Due to the clustered character of the data, the use of a multilevel 
model also avoids false inflation of the significance levels of the macro-level coefficient 
estimates that would plague the results in a simple pooled regression analysis.52 
Our model can be formally illustrated as follows:  
yij Įj + xijȕ İij, 
  ZKHUHĮj = ȖjȌ ȗj. 
Individual (i) tolerance levels in a given country (j) are denoted as yij.  The individual-level 
covariates are contained in xij and the country-level covariates are contained in Ȗj.  The vector ȕ 
contains the coefficients associated with xij, and the vector Ȍcontains the coefficients associated 
with Ȗj  7KH LQWHUFHSWV DUH FDSWXUHG ZLWK Įj DQG YDU\ E\ FRXQWU\ DQG WKH ȗj term captures 
variation around these intercepts.  The random error for each individual is repUHVHQWHGZLWKWKHİij 
WHUP7KHHVWLPDWLRQRIWKLVHTXDWLRQSURYLGHVDPHDVXUHRIȡ YDUȗ>YDUȗYDUİ@RUWKH
proportion of unmodeled individually-held tolerance due to unobserved country-level effects.   
We first reexamine the bivariate relationship between democracy and tolerance in the multilevel 
setting.  Model 1 of Table 2 displays the results.  Again, results indicate that tolerance tends to 
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increase with the level of effective democracy.  On average, a one-unit increase on our 0 to 10 
effecWLYHGHPRFUDF\YDULDEOHFRUUHVSRQGVWRDERXWDXQLWLQFUHDVHRQH¶VOHYHORIWROHUDQFH
or about three percent of the scale.  A standard deviation increase in effective democracy 
FRUUHVSRQGVWRDERXWDXQLWLQFUHDVHLQRQH¶VVRFLDOWROHUDQFHOHYel.   
[Table 2 about here] 
In Model 2 we examine whether this bivariate relationship holds with the introduction of control 
variables and the authoritarian predisposition measure.  As is reported in Table 2, the relationship 
between effective democracy and tolerance maintains significance.  This lends credence to our 
first hypothesis, that of pluralistic conditioning; an increase in pluralism in a country corresponds 
to an increase in individual social tolerance. 
To test our second hypothesis, that the negative relationship between authoritarian predisposition 
and tolerance is magnified in pluralist, democratic societies ± aversive pluralistic conditioning ± 
we include an interaction between effective democracy and authoritarian predisposition in Model 
3.  In this model, the effective democracy variable becomes a conditioning variable; we expect 
that the negative effect of an authoritarian predisposition on tolerance will increase in size along 
with the level of democracy. 
Our hypothesis predicts a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term, as is 
reported in Table 2.  Note that the coefficients on constitutive variables in interaction terms (and 
their associated significance levels) should generally not be interpreted, and the absolute size of 
the coefficient on the interaction term must be interpreted relative to the range of the interacted 
variables.  Thus, to fully display the conditional relationship between authoritarian predisposition 
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and tolerance, we graph this relationship across the range of the effective democracy variable in 
Figure 4.53 
[Figure 4 about here] 
As illustrated in Figure 4, the analysis conforms to our expectation.  The negative relationship 
between authoritarian predisposition and tolerance increases in strength at a remarkable rate as 
the level of effective democracy increases.  In nondemocratic and less democratic regimes there 
is a negative relationship between an authoritarian predisposition and tolerance, but it is 
relatively small in magnitude.  In more pluralistic democracies, this relationship is considerably 
VWURQJHU)RUH[DPSOHZKHQWKHHIIHFWLYHGHPRFUDF\PHDVXUHHTXDOV$OEDQLD¶VOHYHOWKH
coefficient on authoritarian predisposition is about -0.003.  This indicates that a unit increase in 
the authoritarian predisposition measure corresponds to a decrease of less than one percent of the 
UDQJHRIWKHWROHUDQFHVFDOH:KHQWKHOHYHORIHIIHFWLYHGHPRFUDF\LV$XVWULD¶VOHYHOWKH
coefficient on authoritarian predisposition is roughly -0.023, or 2.3 percent of the range of the 
tolerance scale, a much more pronounced effect.  In line with our hypotheses, the results 
demonstrate that higher levels of democracy promote tolerance among the public in general, but 
promote relative intolerance among authoritarians. 
While Figure 4 demonstrates a significant and substantive difference in the effect of an 
authoritarian predisposition on social tolerance as effective democracy increases, this figure does 
not demonstrate whether authoritarians at high levels of effective democracy are more or less 
tolerant than those at low levels of effective democracy.  In Figure 5 we plot the relationship 
between effective democracy and social tolerance (controlling for all other variables in Model 2) 
for two groups: those who score the highest on the authoritarian predisposition measure 
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(authoritarians) and those who score lowest on the authoritarian predisposition measure 
(libertarians). 
[Figure 5 about here] 
Figure 5 demonstrates that although the negative impact of authoritarian predisposition on social 
tolerance does increase along with effective democracy (as illustrated in Figure 4), social 
tolerance on the whole among authoritarians is higher where democracy is  more effective.  Yet, 
the slope of the increase in tolerance vis-à-vis effective democracy among authoritarians is flatter 
than the line for libertarians, which results in an increasing gap between authoritarians and 
libertarians  Higher levels of effective democracy correspond to lower levels of tolerance among 
authoritarians relative to libertarians, but to higher levels of tolerance in authoritarians in the 
absolute. 
With the exception of gender, each of the individual-level control variables attains statistical 
significance across the models.  Older cohorts, those who identify with right-wing ideology, and 
those with a religious disposition tend toward lower levels of tolerance, while those with more 
education are more tolerant.  Neither of the country-level control variables reaches statistical 
significance. 
As mentioned above, an exploratory factor analysis indicated that our social tolerance scale is 
composed of two separate, yet correlated, groups: the first being composed of people of a 
different race and immigrants/foreign workers and the second being composed of people with 
AIDS, homosexuals, drug users, and heavy drinkers.  As the social tolerance literature does not 
generally focus on the latter groups and emphasizes the former, to demonstrate the robustness of 
our findings, we present results for two separate social tolerance scales.  The first is composed of 
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WKHTXHVWLRQVIRFXVLQJRQUDFHDQGLPPLJUDWLRQZKLFKZHFDOO³YLVLEOHRXWJURXSV´7KHVHFRQG
is composed of the questions related to AIDS, homosexuals, drug users, and heavy drinkers, 
ZKLFKZHFDOO³OHVVYLVLEOHRXWJURXSV´ The former scale has an alpha coefficient of 0.65 and the 
latter an alpha of 0.68.   
Results, given in Tables 3 and 4, demonstrate that support for our hypotheses is also realized 
with the use of these less inclusive scales.  That is, while tolerance, as represented by each scale, 
is higher where effective democracy is higher, higher levels of effective democracy also 
correspond with a stronger negative relationship between authoritarianism and social tolerance. 
There is one interesting pattern realized in the control variables worth mentioning²it appears 
that while religiosity correlates negatively with tolerance toward less visible outgroups such as 
drug users and homosexuals, it relates positively to tolerance of other races and immigrants.  
Patterns are similar in further multilevel logit analyses of expressed tolerance toward each 
individual group.  These analyses are not shown in the interest of space (a total of 18 new 
models), but are available from the authors upon request.   
 [Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
Conclusion 
The theory of pluralistic conditioning states that when exposed to diversity in the absence of 
aversive conditions, an individual will become more tolerant of outgroups.  This same thesis also 
predicts that when exposed to diversity in the presence of aversive conditions, an individual will 
become less tolerant of diversity in society. 
To test the pluralistic conditioning thesis, we look to an encompassing measure of pluralism: a 
FRXQWU\¶V OHYHO RI HIIHFWLYH democracy.  As countries move from autocracy toward a fully 
 25 
effective democracy where liberal democratic principles are most completely translated from the 
abstract into concrete practice, they become increasingly pluralistic.  The diversity inherent in 
pluralistic societies classically conditions members of those societies to accept diversity when 
exposure is under neutral or positive conditions.  Under aversive conditions, however, exposure 
to diversity propagates intolerance toward outgroups.   
The analyses in this paper assume that populations largely exist in relatively neutral or positive 
environments and therefore that exposure to the diversity inherent to effective democracy will 
increase individual tolerance toward outgroups.  On the other hand, for individuals with an 
authoritarian predisposition, individuals who are inherently averse to heterogeneity, exposure to 
the diversity inherent to effective democracy will automatically occur under aversive conditions 
and thereby will promote relative intolerance.  The analyses in this paper reveal that while 
effective democracy is positively related to social tolerance for the population at large, the 
experience of effective democracy also exacerbates the negative relationship between 
authoritarianism and social tolerance.  This provides support for the pluralistic conditioning 
theses. 
The pluralistic conditioning thesis is a simple explanation relating an effective democracy to 
increased individual tolerance.  Unlike democratic learning theses, which require cognitive 
processing and acceptance of liberal democratic norms favorable to politically tolerant attitudes, 
pluralistic conditioning requires neither cognitive processing nor even awareness.54  Instead, 
pluralistic conditioning simply allows one to become accustomed to the diversity manifest in 
modern democracies and thereby become less averse to such; or, if exposed to that diversity 
under aversive conditions, to become conditioned to be more averse to such. 
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Our findings are consistent with the pluralistic conditioning thesis proposed in this paper.  
However, the evidence is far from conclusive and further research is clearly necessary.  The 
evidence marshaled here comes from numerous countries and while we have employed 
numerous control variables and multilevel models in order to make inferences across countries 
credible, it is still possible that some unconsidered factor is driving our findings, making the 
relationships we have uncovered spurious.  There is less danger of this with time series analyses, 
which would allow for the capture of dynamic trends within countries.  Time series analyses 
would also provide evidence regarding whether the relationship between effective democracy 
and tolerance is causal.  We avoided strong causal language in this paper due to this shortcoming 
in the data, instead framing our arguments in associational terms; it is certainly possible that 
higher levels of tolerance lead countries to adopt more liberal democratic reforms.  
Unfortunately, there is currently no existing data source that includes the questions necessary to 
measure authoritarian predisposition and social tolerance and provides the temporal variation 
necessary to address our theorized causal relationships. Our expectation is that, much like the 
relationships uncovered in this cross-national examination, as a country becomes more 
³HIIHFWLYHO\GHPRFUDWLF´WKHJDSLQWROHUDQFHOHYHOVDPRQJDXWKRULWDULDQVDQGQRQ-authoritarians 
will widen, while tolerance levels will rise on the whole. 
Decades of psychological research indicate that there are a host of forces at work shaping 
individual's thoughts and actions.  Classical conditioning, operant conditioning, social learning, 
as well as other forces, all appear to play a part.  Our intent in writing this paper is not to propose 
that pluralistic conditioning is the sole explanation for an individual's level of tolerance.  This 
would ignore common sense as well as previous research.  There is ample evidence that 
cognition and emotion can either reinforce each other or push attitudes in opposite directions - a 
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combination of democratic learning (cognition) and pluralistic conditioning (emotion) provides 
an apt explanation for Figure 5.   
As with much of the research on democracy and tolerance, though, the overall finding of this 
research is that liberal democracy and tolerance are closely and positively related.  Even for 
those individuals who feel threatened by pluralism and the expression of diversity and who are 
likely to be relatively less comfortable in free and open democratic societies, liberal democracy 
nevertheless appears to relate closely to tolerant attitudes towards outgroups.  Thus, a more 
liberal democratic world equates with a more tolerant world, meaning deepening democracy is a 
worthy pursuit due not only to proximate benefits, such as political rights and civil liberties, but 
also because of the indirect benefit of a tolerant populace. 
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Figure 1: Social Tolerance Across Countries 
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Figure 2: Effective Democracy Across Countries 
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Figure 3: Democracy and Tolerance 
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Figure 4: The Effect of Authoritarian Predispositions on Social Tolerance as the Level of 
Democracy Changes 
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Figure 5: The Effect of Effective Democracy on Social Tolerance for Authoritarians and 
Libertarians
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Individual-Level     
Social Tolerance 0.580 0.258 0.000 1.000 
Social Tolerance (Visible Outgroups) 0.829 0.326 0.000 1.000 
Social Tolerance (Less Visible Outgroups) 0.456 0.332 0.000 1.000 
Authoritarian Predisposition 1.888 1.024 0.000 4.000 
Age 41.566 16.529 15.000 98.000 
Education 3.622 1.472 1.000 6.000 
Gender (male) 0.502 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Ideology 5.734 2.366 1.000 10.000 
Religiosity -0.063 0.833 -2.999 1.100 
     
Country-Level     
Effective Democracy 4.817 2.961 0.467 9.760 
GDP Per Capita 2.116 1.268 -0.457 4.030 
Social Heterogeneity 0.389 0.252 0.002 0.930 
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Table 2: Social Tolerance, Authoritarianism, and Effective Democracy 
Coefficient Estimates and Significance Levels 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Individual-Level       
Authoritarian Predisposition   -0.013 0.000 0.001 0.605 
Age   -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
Education   0.011 0.000 0.011 0.000 
Gender (male)   -0.001 0.554 -0.000 0.816 
Ideology   -0.005 0.000 -0.004 0.000 
Religiosity   -0.010 0.000 -0.010 0.000 
       
Country-Level       
Effective Democracy 0.028 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.035 0.000 
GDP Per Capita   -0.007 0.705 -0.006 0.750 
Social Heterogeneity   0.020 0.721 0.017 0.753 
       
Interaction       
Authoritarian Predisposition ¯ 
Effective Democracy     -0.003 0.000 
       
Constant 0.443 0.000 0.502 0.000 0.476 0.000 
Model Statistics 
ȇ 0.180 0.166 0.169 
R2 0.101 0.116 0.116 
Prob.  > Ȥ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of Observations 75478 75478 75478 
Number of Countries 75 75 75 
       
Note: p-values are two sided.
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Table 3: Social Tolerance, Authoritarianism, and Effective Democracy (Visible 
Outgroups) 
Coefficient Estimates and Significance Levels 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Individual-Level       
Authoritarian Predisposition   -0.006 0.000 0.011 0.000 
Age   -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
Education   0.014 0.000 0.013 0.000 
Gender (male)   -0.004 0.088 -0.003 0.168 
Ideology   -0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.000 
Religiosity   0.007 0.000 0.008 0.000 
       
Country-Level       
Effective Democracy 0.020 0.000 0.013 0.071 0.018 0.009 
GDP Per Capita   0.035 0.038 0.037 0.031 
Social Heterogeneity   0.121 0.017 0.118 0.020 
       
Interaction       
Authoritarian Predisposition ¯ 
Effective Democracy     -0.003 0.000 
       
Constant 0.732 0.000 0.665 0.000 0.632 0.000 
Model Statistics 
ȡ 0.103 0.081 0.081 
R2 0.033 0.050 0.051 
Prob.  > Ȥ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of Observations 75478 75478 75478 
Number of Countries 75 75 75 
       
Note: p-values are two sided. 
 49 
Table 4: Social Tolerance, Authoritarianism, and Effective Democracy (Less Visible 
Outgroups) 
Coefficient Estimates and Significance Levels 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Individual-Level       
Authoritarian Predisposition   -0.016 0.000 -0.004 0.047 
Age   -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 
Education   0.010 0.000 0.010 0.000 
Gender (male)   0.000 0.833 0.001 0.647 
Ideology   -0.005 0.000 -0.004 0.000 
Religiosity   -0.019 0.000 -0.018 0.000 
       
Country-Level       
Effective Democracy 0.032 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.043 0.000 
GDP Per Capita   -0.028 0.284 -0.027 0.303 
Social Heterogeneity   -0.031 0.695 -0.033 0.679 
       
Interaction       
Authoritarian Predisposition ¯ 
Effective Democracy     -0.002 0.000 
       
Constant 0.298 0.000 0.421 0.000 0.398 0.000 
Model Statistics 
ȡ 0.214 0.140 0.203 
R2 0.079 0.092 0.092 
Prob.  > Ȥ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of Observations 75478 75478 75478 
Number of Countries 75 75 75 
       
Note: p-values are two sided. 
 
